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Abusive images of children; judicial order to
provide copies of images to defence; refusal
by prosecution; reasonableness of judicial
order and practical arrangements
This a corrected version by HH Judge Pearson of his
ruling originally transcribed by Mendip-Wordwave,
official court reporters to the Crown Court at
Portsmouth
Ruling
On Monday of this week there was an application by the
defence that these proceedings be stayed as an abuse
of process and I deferred my decision so I could
consider the matter fully and indicated that I would
announce my decision and the reasons behind it this
morning.
The defendant faces an indictment containing 20
counts of making indecent photographs of children,
contrary to Section One of the Protection of Children Act
1978. I am told that the total number of images in
question amounts to some 240. The defendant pleaded
not guilty to all counts on that indictment and the trial
was set down for next week, although it has been taken
out of the list because whatever my decision the matter
would not be trial-ready on Monday. The matter has
been before this court on a number of occasions, both
for Plea and Case Management Hearings and for a
Further Directions hearing. The most significant of the
hearings so far as this application is concerned was the
hearing on the 8th of October of last year when I made a
number of orders, they included an order that an album
of images to be prepared for the use of the judge, the
defence to be shown an identical copy, with appropriate
undertakings and consideration to be given as to the
manner in which the images are to be shown on screen
for the jury. That order was made after comparatively
brief arguments from counsel. The order was resisted by
the Crown at that stage, but nevertheless the order was
made. Since then the prosecution have not complied
with the terms of the order and have invited me to
reconsider the matter and to make a fresh and different
order concerning the way in which the images should be
dealt with. I heard the full argument on Monday and, as
I have said, deferred the matter until today. It may be
helpful at this stage if I indicate how these cases have
been dealt with in Hampshire; there is no reason to
suppose that the Hampshire practice is significantly
different from other areas.
Now as it is well known it is quite common for the
police nationally and locally to mount operations
against suspected down-loaders of indecent images of
children; they are given operation names and the most
current operation happens to be called Operation Tardis,
and this is one such case arising from Operation Tardis.
Now to ensure consistency and continuity the Presiding
Judges and the Resident Judges have decided to
nominate a Serious Sexual Offences ticketed judge to
hear all cases in specific areas arising from those
operations. Generally speaking, it takes 12 to 18 months
approximately for all the cases to filter through from the
Magistrates Court and to be dealt with at the Crown
Court. The nominated judge in Portsmouth certainly
also deals with quite a high preponderance of stand-
alone cases; that is downloading cases not connected
with a particular operation. They are listed before the
nominated judge as a matter of convenience by the List
Office. Now I was the nominated judge to deal with all
cases arising from Operation Tardis and I believe the
appointment was at the end of 2007, early 2008. I think
and believe this is the last case arising from that
operation, no doubt a different ticketed judge will take
over from me on the next operation. But inevitably,
because of what I said, the nominated judge would have
dealt with scores of such cases during the term of his
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nomination, if I can call it that.
The cases tend to follow a very similar pattern. The
majority are guilty pleas and in these cases the practice
has arisen that the officer in the case prepares a
schedule of the images, they are given a brief
description as to the acts in which the images allegedly
depict, they are given a number under the Copine Scale
(that is the scale from 1 to 5) and the defence either
agree that or they do not. Generally speaking the
defence do agree, having looked at the particular
images, that the categorisation is correct as undertaken
by the officer in the case. In these circumstances there
is usually no need therefore for the judge to see the
images, or if he does the judge would tend to see only a
small representative sample and he deals with the
matter on the basis of Section 10 admission that the
schedule is accurate.1 If the pleas are not guilty then, in
the majority of cases, a similar position applies
because, again, a schedule is prepared and tends to be
agreed. The majority of not guilty cases arise on two
bases. In the first type the defendant indicates that he
was not responsible for the downloading and thus it
tends to be a fairly simple factual dispute as to whether
the defendant was the downloader of what is, in the
main, agreed to be indecent images of children. A
second category arises quite frequently on not guilty
pleas and is where the defendant indicates that there
may have been a downloading, but there cannot be any
possession because the images have been deleted from
the hard drive, or whatever. This is the so-called Atkins v
DPP defence,2 or the Crown v Porter defence,3 and it
needs in the main in those cases expert evidence being
heard as to where the images may have been stored or
cached at various times. Either way the standard
practice is for the prosecution and defence to agree the
number and nature of the images and therefore again,
even on not guilty pleas there is, generally speaking, no
need for the judge or jury to be troubled with seeing the
actual images. The defence obviously, whether it be a
guilty plea or a not guilty plea, are permitted facilities
for counsel, and experts if necessary, to view the images
in a controlled situation, generally at a particular police
station. Occasionally, and it is more unusual, a defence
is raised that the images are not those of children
and/or that the images are not indecent. This is quite a
different situation because quite apart from anything
else the jury in those circumstances will have to decide
those two points; that is to say, are the images those of
children and are they indecent? And the jury will have to
do that by reference to a detailed examination of
specific images and the jury therefore will have to see
those specific images and see them, it would seem to
me, in some detail. In those types of case, which are
relatively unusual, the defendant would also need to
discuss with his counsel, in detail, image by image as to
why he is saying a specific image is not that of a child,
or if it is not indecent. This is one such case of those
slightly unusual circumstances because the two defence
case statements raise the defence that some, or all, of
the images are images of adults, not children. For that
reason, and for the fact that of course we would need a
detailed consideration of the 240 images, I made the
order that I did – that the images be copied, either in
album form or, perhaps, by way of a DVD on a laptop
and that they be supplied on strict undertakings as to
their retention, for example not to be copied and
matters of that nature. Now there is no protocol that
applies here between the courts and the CPS,4 it is just
an ad-hoc practice that has grown up over the last few
years. There is apparently a document called
Memorandum of Understanding between the Director of
Public Prosecutions and the Association of Chief Police
Officers, which applies to the making of images in
downloading cases, or the copying of images in
downloading cases, for evidential purposes. That was
referred to in the CPS letter of the 10th December. I
asked the prosecution if there was a copy of that
Memorandum of Understanding available; there is not
apparently and I do not think it takes the matter much
further, but certainly it has obviously been considered
by the CPS and the police to what should apply between
them, but there is no protocol, as I have said, that
applies between the CPS and the courts.
That is the background.
Now the defence position is this; that the images
themselves are what could be called primary disclosure,
I know that is a slightly out of date term now because
disclosure is a continuing obligation, but the defence
say this is primary disclosure under the Criminal
Procedure Investigations Act 1996 and the images
should therefore be disclosed and they should be
disclosed in such a way as to allow the defence to have
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1 Criminal Justice Act 1967.
2 Atkins v DPP; Goodlands v DPP [2000] 2 Cr.App.R.
248.
3 R v Porter [2006] EWCA Crim 560.
4 Crown Prosecution Service.
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the opportunity to present fully their case. The
prosecution’s offer to view this material in a conference
room here at court, but in sight and within earshot of
the officer in the case, the defence say is not
acceptable. The defence say that if the jury are to be
shown in some form, either by way of hard copies of the
photographs, or by way of images on a laptop and that
the jury should be in a position to view those images in
the privacy of their room during deliberations then the
defence should be in no worse position than the jury,
that they should be dealt with in exactly the same way.
The defence say that they would comply with any
undertakings necessary as to dissemination and the
return of the copies of the DVD at the conclusion of the
case. They would undertake not to photocopy further
and things of that nature, and they say that in the
circumstances, bearing in mind the slightly unusual
nature of this defence being put forward, the
prosecution should comply with my original order and
their failure to do so technically puts the Crown in
contempt of court.
Now what of the prosecution position? Well that is
largely set out in the letter of the 10th of December.
What the prosecution says it that disclosure can take
place adequately without the need for making of copies
either by way of hard copies or by way of a DVD to view
on a laptop. The perusal of the items concerned would
be sufficient if it takes place in the interview room here
at the court. Making copies of such images should be
avoided at all costs; they go further and they say that
any Crown Prosecution Service employee could be
committing an offence if he copied, either by way of
hard copies or by way of DVD, the images in question
and supplied those to the defence and there is a clear
public policy that requests of this nature from the
defence should be refused and orders of the court
should also be refused in the particular circumstances.
Well that is the background, what of the law regarding
abuse of process? Well the principles are set out in
Archbold at Chapter 4, paragraphs 48 onwards.5 I have
to, of course, deal with any abuse of process within the
context of Article 6 of the European Convention on
Human Rights including Article 6(3)(b) – that the
defence have adequate facility for the preparation of
their defence and that, overall, the trial must be fair. It is
a matter of course for the defence to satisfy me on the
balance of probabilities that the continuation of this trial
would be an abuse of process. What are the principles?
Well they are well known and of course they are all set
out, as I have indicated, in Chapter 4, paragraphs 48
onwards, Connelly v DPP6 says, “What all their
Lordships do seem to agree upon it that the court has a
general and inherent power to protect its process from
abuse. This power must include a power to safeguard an
accursed person from oppression or prejudice”. The
matter is further developed so far as authorities in cases
like Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v Phillip.7
In Hui Chi-Ming v R8 an abuse of process was defined in
that case as “something so unfair and wrong that the
court should not allow a prosecutor to proceed with
what is in all other respects a regular proceedings”. Two
strands of authorities have been identified by the Court
of Appeal where abuse of process may arise, namely (a)
where the defendant would not receive a fair trial
and/or (b) where it be unfair for the defendant to be
tried (see R v Beckford9). And this latter type will include
cases where the prosecution “have manipulated or
misused the process of the court so as to deprive the
defendant of protection provided by the law or to take
unfair advantage of a technicality” and R v Derby Crown
Court10 refers to a situation where it may “ be contrary to
public interest and the integrity of the criminal justice
system that a trial should take place.”
I have been referred to the authority of R v Early,11
which is the eavesdropping authority and the defence
suggest that for the OIC12 to stand outside an interview
room with the defendant and his counsel both within
view and potentially within earshot would be
inappropriate and they say it is analogous to the R v
Early situation. The authorities make clear that each
case will depend on its own facts, that of course each
case is unique and I must decide this case on the
particular facts that apply here. There is no direct
authority on this particular point to assist me. The
nearest direct authority in the authorities is set out at
page 402 of Archbold, which is summarised, “A stay
should also be granted, if the behaviour of the
prosecution has been so bad that it is not fair that the
defendant should be tried.” And then in this regard, a
useful test is that there should be either an element of
bad faith or at least some serious fault on behalf of the
prosecution.
Well would the Crown have discharged their relevant
duty of disclosure adequately by allowing access by the
5 Archbold: Criminal Pleading, Evidence and
Practice (Sweet & Maxwell).
6 [1964] AC 1254, HL.
7 [1995] 1 AC 396, [1994] 3 WLR 1134, [1995] 1 All ER
93.
8 [1992] 1 AC 34.
9 [1996] 1 Cr App R 94.
10 R v Derby Crown Court ex p. Brooks, 80 Cr.
App.R.164, DC.
11 [2002] EWCA Crim 1904, [2003] 1 Cr.App.R 19, CA.
12 Officer in the case.
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expert only at the police station, and then purely in the
conference room here at court, with the defendant and
counsel in full view and potentially in earshot of the OIC.
I have actually inspected the available rooms, it seems
to me quite clear that the officer in the case, if he
wishes to ensure that the material stays in his view,
would have to be very close by the interview room. They
are not sound proofed and it would seem to me that it is
highly likely that the OIC would be in a position to hear
what is passing between the defendant and his counsel.
In my view that is not satisfactory. In this case, the jury
will have to have the images either in printed album
form or on a laptop and the jury, as I say, will be or
should be entitled, and would be entitled to consider
those images in the privacy of their retiring room. I see
no reason why the defendant should be in a worse
position than the jury. And in my view, therefore, the
disclosure duty upon the prosecution would not have
been discharged adequately by the suggestion from the
Crown.
That is the first issue, have they discharged their
burden of disclosure. Would it be fair for the trial to
proceeding in that manner, and I have come to the view
that it would not be fair.
The second issue is the question of public policy and
that is, in broad terms, the Crown say, well there should
really be almost a blanket ban on the copying of images
of this type. Yes, I entirely agree with that, what I do not
agree with is that the Crown could say that any
employee who makes copies as a direct result of a court
order would be liable to prosecution. I regard that as
somewhat fanciful. There will be a clear defence under
Section 1, sub-section 4, paragraph (a) of the Protection
of Children Act 1978 and it reads as follows, “Where a
person is charged with an offence under subsection (1),”
that is taking or making, “it shall be a defence for him to
prove that he had a legitimate reason for distributing or
showing the photographs or having them in his
possession.” So there is a clear statutory defence there
set out. This is mirrored to a very similar extent in the
Criminal Justice Act 1988, Section 160 because sub-
section 2 of 160 reads, “Where a person is charged with
an offence under subsection (1) above,” that is basically
having in his possession indecent images, “it shall be a
defence for him to prove that he had a legitimate reason
for having the photograph or pseudo-photograph in his
possession.”
I agree that both of those statutory offences involve
what is called the reverse burden of proof, that is to say
it will be up to a particular employee to satisfy a court
the he had such a defence. But it seems to me that if the
material was copied, as a result of a specific direction
from a judge, it would be inconceivable that any staff
member would be prosecuted. And even if they were, no
doubt the prosecution would be stopped at the very
earliest stage on an application by defence counsel.
Now I am very very reluctant indeed to stay
proceedings, particularly in relation to alleged offences
regarding images of child abuse, such images are very
wide spread, they are deeply unpleasant and these are
pernicious offences which have to be dealt with most
severely. But in this particular case, I am driven to the
conclusion that I must stay these proceedings as an
abuse of process; the defence have satisfied me on a
balance of probabilities that is appropriate to do so. In
my view, the orders that I made in October as to the
disclosure of the images were reasonable and
proportionate and the minimum necessary to ensure a
fair trial. The images would have been supplied only
subject to strict undertakings from the defence, as I say,
as to their safe custody, that they are returned, the way
in which they should be viewed and a prohibition on
making additional copies. The alternative arrangement
suggested by the Crown would have been insufficient. I
will mention at this stage that a least one previous trial
before me, the case of R v Aldridge has been tried and
has been dealt with satisfactorily, very much on the
basis of similar orders I made in this case in October;
that is to say the defence and the jury on Newport, Isle
of Wight, had copies of the images and they had to
examine them one by one to form a view as to whether
the images in question with those of children, and
whether they were indecent. It seems to me that that
case proceeded satisfactorily, as it turns out, that
defendant was convicted and has been sentenced. It
seems to me that if it worked satisfactorily in that case
there is no reason, I suppose, it would not work
satisfactorily in this case.
I make clear therefore that my decision that these
proceedings must be stayed is only on the basis that
the Crown Prosecution Service have failed to comply
with the order that I have made as to the copying of the
images for the defence. The stay therefore is subject to
that order not being complied with. If the Crown
Prosecution Service, on reflection, decide that they wish
to comply, then in my view the case will proceed and
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should proceed to trial.
That is my decision and I have given the full reasons.
Now I am aware that this may amount to a terminating
ruling under Section 58 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
And it may be that the prosecution wish to appeal it, I
do not know, if they do I will deal with the mechanics of
that now so we know where they stand.13
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13 His Honour Judge Pearson granted permission for
the Ruling to be published in the Review by an
exchange of letters and e-mails with the editor, and
he corrected a number of typographical errors that
were published in the transcript. It is probable that
a judicial judgment is the copyright of the Crown,
although it might rest with the individual Judge in
England & Wales. In responding to the Gowers
Review of Intellectual Property (HMSO, November
2006), Philip Leith, Professor of Law at Queen’s
University of Belfast submitted a short paper
Copyright in the Digital Age: court judgments, in
which he briefly illustrated the position of
copyright of judgments in Ireland and the UK
(considered to be unsatisfactory), and suggested
that both countries should harmonise the position
in relation to the practice in the USA and the EU,
available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/
queens_university_of_belfast_237_kb.pdf. It is
possible that section 163 of the Copyright, Designs
and Patents Act 1988 applies to judicial judgments,
although the reader is also referred to ‘Crown
copyright: An overview for government
departments’ (October 2010) and ‘UK Government
Licensing Framework for public sector information’
(National Archives), available at
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/information-
management/uk-gov-licensing-framework.htm. Of
interest, the National Archives claim that the latter
document is ‘delivered’ by the National Archives.
A postman or postwoman delivers the post, but
the National Archives can only write and make
available a document.
